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Brentano’s New Understanding of Psychology  
in Light of His Reading of English Empiricists1
I. Introduction
Shortly after the completion of his habilitation thesis The Psychology of Aris-
totle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect in 1866,2 Franz Brentano, 
for the next several years, embarked upon an intensive course of reading of 
‘English empiricists’ and ‘modern English philosophers’ in preparation for 
his next study Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874).3 The English 
authors that are cited or consulted by Brentano for PES extend to and in-
clude a number of English, Scottish and Irish philosophers, as well as advo-
cates and theoreticians of natural science, such as, for instance: Isaac New-
ton, John Locke, David Hume, George Berkeley, Thomas Reid, Alexander 
1 I would like to thank Klaus Hedwig and William Baumgartner for their very helpful 
suggestions towards the writing of this article. I would also like to thank Elizabeth 
Valentine for a draft of her article on the ‘British Sources in Brentano’s Psychology from 
an Empirical Standpoint, with Special Reference to John Stuart Mill’ which she kindly 
gave me to read, and that is published in this volume.
2 Franz Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active 
Intellect, trans. by Ralph George (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of 
California Press, 1977); Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous 
poiētikos (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867).
3 Franz Brentano, ‘Foreword’, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. by Antos 
C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995), p. xxviii and p. 11. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt 
(Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1874). Henceforth, references will be to English 
translation, and abbreviated in notes as PES.
Brentano Studien 15/1 (2017), 263–290
264
Bain, Thomas Brown, David Hartley, Herbert Spencer, George Henry 
Lewes, Henry Maudsley, George Boole, Sir William Hamilton, William 
Whewell, Charles Darwin, James Mill and John Stuart Mill.4 By ‘modern 
English philosophers’ or ‘English empiricists’, then, Brentano principally 
means authors writing in English and those interested in the natural sci-
ences, and though Brentano had a limited reading-knowledge of English 
— reading these authors mainly in either French or German translation, or 
in commentaries5 — the influence which these ‘English empiricists’ exerted 
on his understanding of the science of psychology did not go unnoticed by 
him, for, as he informs his reader in the 1874 Foreword to PES,
just as there is no specifically German truth, there is no specifically national 
psychology, not even a German one. It is for this reason that I am taking 
into account the outstanding scientific contributions of modern English 
philosophers no less than those of German philosophers. […] In these inve-
stigations and in those which will follow I assail quite frequently and with 
great tenacity even the most outstanding investigators such as Mill, Bain, 
Fechner, Lotze, Helmholtz and others, but this should not be interpreted 
as an attempt either to lessen their merit or weaken their power of their in-
fluence. On the contrary, it is a sign that I, like many others, have felt their 
influence in a special way and have profited from their doctrines, not only 
when I have accepted them, but also when I have had to challenge them.6 
By his own testimony, therefore, the impact which these ‘modern English 
philosophers’ (and German writers) had on his new understanding of ‘psy-
chology’ in the ‘investigations’ of the two books published for PES in 1874 
(and in the later books III to VI planned for this study)7 was exceedingly 
4 In PES, Brentano mentions a total of 23 English authors, with John Stuart Mill quoted 
most often (in 42 pages). See, Valentine, esp., ‘Table 4’.
5 Oskar Kraus notes that Brentano, when quoting from Mill’s System of Logic, uses 
Schiel’s German translation published in 1849 on the basis of the first edition of Mill’s 
Logic (1843). PES, p. 64, (editor’s) n.
6 PES, p. xxviii.
7 Originally, Brentano had planned six books for PES (‘Foreword to the 1874 Edition’, 
pp. xxvii–xxix) but only published the first two: Book I ‘Psychology as a Science’ and 
Book II ‘Psychical Phenomena in General’. The remaining books were to deal with 
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strong for not only did he arrive at this understanding through agreement 
but also even in disagreement with these ‘investigators’.
In this article, I wish to examine some of the main ideas that Brentano 
borrowed in part or in full from those ‘most eminent English psychologists 
of the empiricist school’8 that are of most relevance to an understanding 
and evaluation of Brentano’s new view of ‘psychology’ ‘from an empirical 
standpoint’. Of pivotal importance to the ‘investigations’ which Brentano 
unfurls in PES is a distinction which he draws between the ‘inner percep-
tion of physical phenomena’ and ‘outer perception of physical phenomena’, 
a distinction, as we shall see, he found in the ‘English empiricists’ whom he 
read. This has an important bearing on understanding Brentano’s famous 
re-introduction and appeal to ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle-ages cal-
led the intentional (or mental) in-existence of an object’ as the mark of ‘our 
own psychical phenomena’ in Book II ‘Psychical Phenomena In General’ of 
PES because, as Brentano explicitly remarks, ‘no physical phenomenon [by 
comparison to our own psychical phenomena] exhibits anything like it’.9 In 
this article, therefore, I will first address the main reasons for Brentano’s 
general change of views about the science of psychology and then assess the 
significance of the ‘English empiricists’ in understanding and evaluating his 
use of the concept of intentionality to distinguish ‘psychical phenomena’ 
from ‘physical phenomena’.
II. The Move from Aristotelian Empiricism to English Empiricism
In his habilitation thesis Brentano had investigated and defended Aristotle’s 
view of psychology as the science of the soul, with a particular focus on the 
nature and role of the ‘active intellect’ in cognition in the intellectual soul 
of the human being. In PES, however, Brentano no longer subscribes to 
the Aristotelian theory of the abstractive ability of the human intellectual 
soul in cognition. He accepts, instead, a ‘modern conception’ of psycholo-
gy which secures its ‘experiential basis’ in the direct ‘inner perception of 
the relation between the mind and the body, culminating in addressing the question of 
immortality (Book VI).
8 PES, p. 145. See, also, pp. 13–14, p. 80, and p. 94.
9 PES, pp. 88–89.
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our own psychical phenomena’, and he defines psychology in comparison 
to ‘physics’ which locates its experiential basis in the ‘outer perception of 
physical phenomena’.10 There are several reasons for this change in view 
of the science of psychology, but the two main ones for Brentano are: (1) 
his growing awareness and approval of the rise of the natural sciences (and 
rejection of what he took to be the antithesis of scientific philosophy that 
was exemplified, in his mind, in the windy speculation of post-Kantian 
German idealism) and (2) his general acceptance of a ‘modern definition’ of 
psychology that finds its empirical origins and epistemological justification 
in ‘the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena’. 
Accepting the cultural-intellectual rise in dominance of the natural sci-
ences and subscribing to the view that psychology must be based upon 
‘the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena’, nonetheless, are 
not necessarily mutually supporting positions to hold about the science 
of psychology, as Brentano himself notes in his 1874 study.11 Some natu-
ral scientists, for instance, whilst rejecting as unscientific any Hegelian 
or Schellingian speculation on the evolution of spirit or mind, elaborate a 
natural-scientific approach to psychology that is exclusively based on ob-
servation, hypotheses and laboratory experimentation.12 Thus the appeal 
to the ‘inner perception of our own psychical phenomena’ does not figure 
significantly in the methodological advancement or investigations of the 
science of psychology, as, for instance, in Wilhelm Wundt’s seminal study 
Principles of Physiological Psychology, also published in 1874 and with which 
Brentano was acquainted.13 Auguste Comte, in fact, Brentano remarks, dis-
misses entirely psychology as a genuine science based upon ‘inner observa-
tion’ since any act of ‘inner observation’ of one’s own psychical phenomena 
10 See, PES, Book I, Ch. II ‘Psychological Method with Special Reference to its 
Experiential Basis’. (§ 2 ‘Über die Methode der Psychologie, insbesondere die 
Erfahrung, welche für sie die Grundlage bildet’.)
11 See, PES, Book I, Ch. III, ‘Further Investigations Concerning Psychological Method. 
Induction of the Fundamental Laws of Psychology’.
12 Ibid., and cf., Franz Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, trans. by Benito Müller (London: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 5.
13 Brentano quotes this study on several occasions in PES (see, p. 6), and the work 
of several other natural scientists or philosophers interested in natural-scientific 
endeavours (e.g., Fechner, Maudsley, Bain, Condillac, Helmholtz, Horwicz, Darwin, 
Lavoisier, the Mills).
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by the scientist would itself have to be examined and this, in turn, likewise 
observed, and so on ad infinitum, thus rending this science spurious.14
At the other end of the spectrum, however, Brentano acknowledges 
that there are psychologists who pursue psychology as a science but who 
could not take on board any natural-scientific developments in their un-
derstanding of this science simply because the modern natural science of 
empirical psychology did not exist during their own respective life times 
(e.g., Plato and Aquinas). Brentano admits, nonetheless, that some contem-
porary natural-scientific thinkers have attempted to engage in ‘the mixing’ 
of ‘physiological research’ and ‘psychological investigations’, but this, in his 
estimation, ‘seems by and large ill-advised in important areas’.15 Nowhere, 
alas, does Brentano enumerate or specify precisely in PES those important 
areas where such ‘mixing’ of natural-scientific physiological psychology 
and ‘psychological investigation’ is strongly ill-advised. One area, however, 
where he is adamant that such ‘mixing’ is to be strenuously avoided, is in 
the task of clarifying the meaning of basic concepts that are used in the 
natural science of empirical psychology itself. Again, he has several reasons 
for this and that are of importance to understanding his changing views of 
what ‘psychology’ now means to him. 
Firstly, Brentano tells us that in his reading of modern scientists he found 
‘no unanimity’ among psychologists and scientists regarding what defines 
‘physical phenomena’ and ‘psychical phenomena’, and this was leading to 
a blurring of the boundaries between physics and psychology which was 
unhelpful to the development of both of these sciences.16 Secondly, he notes 
that ‘even important psychologists [citing Bain] maybe hard pressed to de-
fend themselves against the charge of self-contradiction’ in their use and 
meaning of the terms ‘physical’ and ‘psychical phenomena’.17 In Brentano’s 
view, then, such ‘lack of agreement’, coupled with ‘misuse’, ‘confusion’, and 
‘self-contradiction’ by some eminent scientists in their deployment of these 
terms, is a hindrance to the advancement of the natural sciences in gene-
14 See Brentano’s counter-argument to Comte’s, PES, Book I, Ch. 2, §II ‘Inner 
perception as the source of psychological experience. It is not to be confused with 
inner observation, i.e., introspection’.
15 PES, p. 64.
16 Ibid., p. 76.
17 Ibid., p. 77.
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ral and the newly emerging science of empirical psychology in particular. 
Thus Brentano balefully concludes, ‘it is a sign of the immature state of [the 
natural science of] psychology that we can scarcely utter a single sentence 
about psychical phenomena which will not be disputed by many people.’18 
The major problem, therefore, that seems to have arisen for Brentano, fol-
lowing upon his readings of modern psychologists and ‘natural scientists’, 
is that these investigators themselves are in no position to clarify for others 
the meaning of basic terms used in their sciences because these meanings 
are unclear and ambiguous for them and in dispute among themselves as well 
as by others. 
In light of this obscurity, Brentano declares for Book II ‘Psychical Phe-
nomena In General’ of PES, 
our aim is to clarify the meaning of the two terms ‘physical phenomenon’ 
and ‘psychical phenomenon’, removing all misunderstanding and confusion 
concerning them. And it does not matter to us what means we use, as long 
as they really serve to clarify these terms.19 
Since Brentano, nonetheless, cannot resolve this issue of the meaning of 
these two basic terms by appealing to any well-founded theory that has 
been elaborated or established in natural science, nor settle this dispute by 
drawing upon any (debatable) meaning which these terms may enjoy in any 
particular historical, philosophical or cultural understanding of the physical 
and the psychical, his only alternative, so he believes, is to check the me-
aning of these terms against intuition itself, that is to say, against the evi-
dent facts of our experience. What natural scientists study in their science, 
through their use of observation, scientific hypotheses and experimental 
techniques, is simply not the kind of knowledge that we can glean directly 
through ‘the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena’ and the 
‘outer perception of physical phenomena’. Thus, for the purposes of cla-
rifying the meaning of these terms, Brentano declares, ‘my psychological 
standpoint is empirical; experience alone is my teacher.’20 In this regard, 
18 Ibid., p. 70.
19 Ibid., p. 78.
20 1874 ‘Foreword’ to PES, (p. xxxii). Brentano, indeed, uses this ‘experiential basis’ to 
assess various accounts of the ‘psychical phenomena’ of the human soul or mind given 
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Brentano returns, with Hume, and to the latter’s celebrated ‘first maxim, 
that in the end we must rest contented with experience’.21 And it is with this 
kind of philosophical approach to the mind and its contents that Brentano 
found in his reading of ‘English empiricists’ — notwithstanding important 
differences that were elaborated by Locke, Hume, the Mills, Bain et al. 
— that Brentano now puts forward as the only way in which this dispute 
regarding the meaning of these pivotal terms of ‘physical’ and ‘psychical 
phenomena’ can be settled for all concerned today, whether those concerned 
are natural scientists, the ordinary ‘man-in-the-street’, historians of philo-
sophy, or contemporary thinkers who mix up, wrongly, in Brentano’s esti-
mation, physiological and psychological investigations.
III. The Establishment of Psychology  
as a Science of Psychical Phenomena
Towards the very beginning of PES Brentano draws attention to Aristotle’s 
inauguration of psychology as ‘the science of the soul’. By the soul, Bren-
tano informs his reader, Aristotle means the ‘first actuality’ or principle of 
life of ‘a living being’.22 Thus plants, animals and human beings, insofar as 
all of these living beings exhibit signs of immanent self-perfective activity, 
all become the objects of the science of psychology. And so, ‘after establi-
shing the concept of the soul, the oldest work on psychology [De Anima] 
goes on to discuss the most general characteristics of beings endowed with 
vegetative as well as sensory or intellectual faculties’.23 No sooner, however, 
does Brentano give us this account of the institution of psychology as a 
science than he remarks that psychology can no longer be defined in this 
broad Aristotelian sense due to developments in natural science. Various 
by philosophers down through the ages (e.g., by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, 
Kant, ‘English empiricists’, and also some contemporary natural-scientific attempts). 
See, PES, Book II, § V ‘A Survey of the Principal Attempts to Classify Psychical 
Phenomena’.
21 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, 
M.A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) [1739], p. 60.
22 PES, p. 4.
23 Ibid.
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natural sciences, such as botany, zoology and physiology, have emerged and 
taken over the domains of plant-life activity and animal sense-life activity 
that were originally demarcated by Aristotle as part of the science of psy-
chology. Thus,
On the assumption that it lacked consciousness, the entire realm of ve-
getative life ceased to be considered within the scope of their [psycholo-
gists’] investigations. In the same way, the animal kingdom, insofar as it, 
like plants and inorganic things is an object of external perception, was 
excluded from their field of research. This exclusion was also extended to 
phenomena closely associated with sensory life, such as the nervous system 
and muscles, so that their investigation became the province of the physio-
logist rather than the psychologist.24
Notwithstanding the modern gloss of Brentano’s explanation for this 
 change, in Brentano’s review the entire field of exploration into both plant-
life activity and animal-sense-life activity as well as into all organic and in-
organic things, including the nature of human beings, insofar as all of these 
can be subjected to natural-scientific observation, hypotheses and experi-
mentation, all now fall under the remit of established or newly emerging 
natural sciences other than psychology. This, nevertheless, does not mean 
that there is no subject-matter left over for the natural science of psycholo-
gy to study. The excision, rather, of these investigations leaves untouched 
a more narrowly-focused domain of enquiry for psychology, namely, ‘our 
own psychical phenomena’ as objects of ‘inner perception’; or, at least, so 
Brentano now asserts, for, as he stresses,
Psychology, like all natural sciences, has its basis in perception (Wahrneh-
mung) and experience (Erfahrung). Above all, however, its source is to be 
found in the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena (der eigenen 
psychischen Phänomene). We would never know what a thought is, or a jud-
gement, pleasure or pain, desires or aversions, hopes or fears, courage or 
despair, decisions and voluntary intentions if we did not learn what they are 
through inner perception of our own phenomena. Note, however, that we 
said that inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) and not introspection, i.e. 
24 Ibid.
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inner observation (innere Beobachtung), constitutes this primary (erste) and 
indispensable source (unentbehrliche Quelle) of psychology.25
Given Brentano’s strong Aristotelian roots, one would think that he would 
disapprove of this reduction of the subject-matter of psychology to a study 
that is exclusively focused on the ‘inner perception of our own psychical 
phenomena’, irrespective of what disputes there may be and are over the 
meaning, nature and existence of our own psychical phenomena. This, ho-
wever, is not the case because, in Brentano’s estimation, 
This narrowing down of the domain of psychology was not an arbitrary 
one. On the contrary, it appears to be an obvious correction necessitated by 
the nature of the subject-matter itself.26 
Whether such a narrowing down of the domain of enquiry for the science 
of psychology is ‘an obvious correction necessitated by the nature of the sub-
ject-matter itself’, or not, depends of course on one’s view of that subject-
matter. And by 1874 Brentano is clearly of the opinion that psychology 
can no longer be regarded as the study of all potentially embodied living 
beings, as Aristotle and the Aristotelians had held, but as the science of our 
own psychical phenomena. Thus in an allusion to Hume’s position, even 
though Brentano disagrees with Hume’s denial of the existence of the soul 
of a human being as the substantial bearer of ‘presentations’, he declares, in 
agreement with Hume, ‘whether or not there are souls, the fact is there are 
psychical phenomena’.27 These phenomena exhibit their own kind of unity 
and continuity that is amenable to reflective-scientific scrutiny, so Brentano 
now insists, just as both Hume and the Mills had argued.28 Thus Brentano 
believes that he is justified in concluding, with J.S. Mill from his System of 
Logic, that psychology is a science that ‘investigates the laws which govern 
25 Ibid., p. 29, English trans. mod.
26 Ibid., p. 4, my emphasis.
27 Ibid., p. 18.
28 Cf., Brentano’s direct quotation from Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature, Book I, IV, 
Sect. 6, and his comments, prior to this in PES, pp. 16–17.
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the succession of our mental states, i.e., the laws according to which one of 
these states produces another’.29 
Though Brentano accepts — without giving us any supporting argu-
mentation — Mill’s definition of psychology as the study of the laws of 
our mental states, he does nevertheless recognise that there are different 
kinds of laws governing ‘the succession of our mental states’. Laws of logic, 
for instance, are normatively prescriptive in character, directing us on how 
one ought to think correctly. Natural-scientific laws, by comparison, are 
descriptive in character, in the sense that they depict regularities of how 
things must be.30 Thus Brentano never held the belief that the normative 
laws of thought that are exhibited in logic, ethics and aesthetics can be re-
duced to natural-scientific descriptive laws of fact, and points to Comte’s 
erroneous attempt to ‘utilize phrenology as an instrument of psychological 
investigation’.31 This, however, does not mean that Brentano wishes to re-
ject ‘psychology from an empirical standpoint’, as he understands it, that 
is, as an aid to clarifying concepts for both the natural and normative sci-
ences.32 On the contrary, all concepts must have a basis in experience. Thus 
if the ‘modern conception of psychology’ is one that advocates an investi-
gation into ‘our own psychical phenomena’, this extends to and includes 
(in addition to the perception of objects of our external senses) those ex-
periences of a valid normative logical, ethical and aesthetical consciousness 
29 PES, p. 12.
30 Ibid., pp. 98–99.
31 Ibid., p. 48, and see also, p. 33. Edmund Husserl, who attended Brentano’s lectures 
at Vienna University from 1884 to 1886, tells us that one lecture-course he took with 
Brentano was called ‘Selected Psychological and Aesthetic Questions […] [which] was 
devoted mainly to fundamental descriptive analyses of the nature of the imagination’. 
E. Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by 
Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55 (p. 47). Another course 
Husserl took with Brentano was, ‘Elementary Logic and its Needed Reform’, which 
‘dealt with systematically connected basic elements of a descriptive psychology of 
the intellect, without neglecting, however, the parallel elements in the sphere of the 
emotions, to which a separate chapter was devoted’ (ibid.).
32 This causes major tensions in Brentano’s attempt to found the normative status of 
the disciplines of logic, ethics and aesthetics in descriptive empirical psychology. See, 
Theodorus De Boer’s excellent account of this issue in ‘The Descriptive Method of 
Franz Brentano: Its Two Functions and Their Significance for Phenomenology’, in 
The Philosophy of Brentano, pp. 101–7.
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as such. What marks these experiences is the necessity of their connections 
that are evidently true, irrespective of fallible, corrigible, empirical factual- 
psychological laws of thought. In this regard, Brentano is much closer to 
Kant’s two-domain theory of human consciousness than he is to either 
Mill or Aristotle, in his insistence that natural-scientific consciousness and 
normative-scientific consciousness are irreducible to each other.33 Yet this is 
why Brentano can be so adamant about the criticism that the validity of the 
normative sciences of logic, ethics and aesthetics cannot be founded on the 
basis of empirical inductive generalisations, ‘an astounding confusion’ that 
befell Mill himself.34 Still, all psychical act-experiences that are characteri-
stically lived by human beings are to become the ‘subject matter’ for ‘psy-
chology from an empirical standpoint’. This, then, opens up a vast area of 
research for ‘psychology’ (philosophy), just as Mill and Hume had believed. 
In light of this understanding of ‘psychology’, it is understandable why 
Brentano is so enthusiastic about the promising prospects for this fledgling 
natural science of ‘psychology’ to become the ‘science of the future’, for,
The worthiness of a science increases not only according to the manner 
in which it is known [e.g., from alchemy to chemistry], but also with the 
worthiness of its object. And the phenomena of the laws of [psychical phe-
nomena] which psychology investigates are superior to physical phenome-
na not only in that they [psychical phenomena] are true and real in them-
selves, but also in that they are incomparably more beautiful and sublime. 
Colour and sound, extension and motion are contrasted with sensation and 
imagination, judgement and will, with all the grandeur these [psychical] 
phenomena exhibit in the ideas of the artist, the research of the great thin-
ker, and the self-dedication of the virtuous man. So, we have revealed in a 
new way how the task of the psychologist is higher than that of the natural 
scientist.35 
Natural scientists, in other words, may well discover certain laws of natu-
ral-scientific empirical fact about light particles and sound waves in relation 
33 See, De Boer, ‘The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano’, p 102.
34 Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis (Leipzig: Meiner, 1925), pp. 57–58; quoted by 
De Boer, ‘The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano’, p. 102.
35 PES, p. 20, my emphasis.
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to colours and tones, but what an artist feels, expresses, imagines, judges 
and wants in the use of colour and sound in her efforts is qualitatively dif-
ferent yet part of the experiences of the psychical. And these latter concerns 
belong to ‘the task of the psychologist’. It thus now follows for Brentano 
that,
Let me point out merely in passing that psychology contains the roots of ae-
sthetics, which, in a more advanced stage of development, will undoubtedly 
sharpen the eye of the artist and assure his progress. Likewise, suffice to 
say that the important art of logic, a single improvement in which brings 
about a thousand advances in science, also has psychology as its source. 
In addition, psychology has the task of becoming the scientific basis for a 
theory of education, both of the individual and of society. Along with aes-
thetics and logic, ethics and politics also stem from the field of psychology. 
And so, psychology appears to be the fundamental condition of human pro-
gress in precisely those things which, above all, constitute human dignity.36
Underpinning Brentano’s confidence in this new development of ‘psy-
chology’ to assure man’s progress and human dignity, therefore, is his ac-
ceptance of Hume and Mill’s view of psychology as a science that focuses 
attention on the experiences of the human being, whatever these may turn out 
to be, including the experiences of a normatively valid logical, ethical and 
aesthetical consciousness. And since this includes both natural-scientific and 
moral progress of human beings, in all of this Brentano believes that he is 
steadily following the model (and English translation by Schiel) of Mill’s 
‘moral sciences’ for ‘Geisteswissenshaften’ that incorporates and promotes 
the methodology of the natural sciences (Naturwissenshaften) in the ‘mo-
ral sciences’. Yet there are real philosophical tensions in Brentano’s dual 
acceptance of the modern science of empirical psychology which deploys a 
method that is based upon sense observation, natural-scientific hypothes-
36 Ibid., p. 21. Here, we may detect echoes of conversations that Brentano may have held 
with John Henry Newman, later Cardinal, whom he met on a visit to his Oratory 
at Edgbaston in England in 1872 and who was concerned with education (setting up 
the Catholic University in Dublin, Ireland, in 1851) and who had published his ideas 
on The Idea of a University (1852 and 1858). See, Brentano’s letter to Herman Schell, 
in Herman Schell als Wegbereiter zum II. Vatikanischen Konzil, ed. by Josef Hasenfuss 
(Munich: Schöinigh, 1978). See, also, Valentine.
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es and experimentation and his desire to follow ‘modern English philoso-
phers’ who argue that all of the concepts we deploy in human reasoning, 
including a priori laws and universal judgements of normative reasoning, 
must be founded in the ‘inner perception of our own psychical phenome-
na’. How these two methods — the method of the natural sciences and the 
method of the ‘inner perception of our own psychical phenomena’ — are 
supposed to come together in any unified conception of the modern science 
of ‘psychology from an empirical standpoint’ is simply not explained by 
Brentano in his 1874 study. Nor does he see any problem here. He hopes 
rather, optimistically, that the newly emerging natural science of empirical 
psychology will sort this issue out as it develops. Yet it is through following 
Locke and Hume’s methodological commitment to the way consciousness 
can access knowledge of itself through reflection on itself that Brentano 
actually establishes and elaborates his ‘psychology from an empirical stand-
point’ in his 1874 study.
IV. The Distinction Between the Inner Perception  
of Our Own Psychical Phenomena  
and the Outer Perception of Physical Phenomena
Central to the ‘empirical standpoint’ upon which the science of psychology 
is to be built, as far as Brentano understands it in PES, is a distinction which 
he believes exists between the inner perception of our own psychical phe-
nomena and the outer perception of physical phenomena. As he declares, 
in the opening lines of Book II ‘Psychical Phenomena In General’ of PES: 
‘The entire world of our appearances can be divided into two large classes, 
i.e., into the classes of physical and psychical phenomena;’37 a division that he 
had already used, without any argumentation or explanation, throughout 
Book I ‘Psychology As a Science’. Nowhere, however, does Brentano tell 
us in PES from where he derives this division of ‘the entire world of our 
37 ‘Die gesamte Welt unserer Erscheinungen zerfällt in zwei große Klassen, in die 
Klasse der physischen und in die der psychischen Phänomene.’ Zweites Buch. Von den 
psychischen Phänomenen im allgemeinen. p. 108. Brentano’s original italics retained, 
and McAlister’s et. al. English trans. mod.: ‘All the data of consciousness are divided 
into two great classes – the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena.’ PES, 
p. 77.
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appearances into two large classes’; or, why this is a valid distinction. He 
does hint at a possible source for this distinction in a gloss on Aristotle’s 
analysis of the voluntary actions of human beings in Book III of De Anima 
where, ‘he [Aristotle] dismisses the thought of investigating the organs that 
serve as intermediaries between a desire and the part of the body toward 
whose movement the desire is directed […], sounding exactly like a modern 
psychologist, [saying] such an investigation is not the province of one who 
studies the soul, but of one who studies the body’.38 This allusion, none-
theless, only indicates where a comparable distinction can be found and 
what the object of a physiological conception of psychology is and should be, 
namely, the human body and things that matter in it and to it. This is not 
an argument for ‘the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena’ 
as the exclusive subject-matter for ‘a modern psychologist’. Brentano’s dis-
tinction between what counts as the proper method and subject-matter of 
psychology, ‘the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena’, and 
Aristotle’s rejection of a naturalistic reduction of voluntary acts of a human 
being to physiological explanations of the (human) body is more akin, rat-
her, to Hume’s distinction in A Treatise of Human Nature between Hume’s 
own psychological approach to analysing the workings of the human mind 
and the way natural scientists conduct their science, for, as Hume writes,
The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural 
philosophers [natural scientists] than to moral [philosophers]; and there-
fore shall not at present be enter’d upon.39 
It is of course textually true that Hume explicitly announces that he is going 
to apply the method of ‘reasonings concerning the body’ in the natural sci-
ence of anatomy to his own ‘anatomy of the mind’, saying,
’Tis usual with anatomists to join their observations and experiments on 
human bodies to those on beasts, and from the agreement of these experi-
ments to derive an additional argument for any particular hypothesis. ’Tis 
indeed certain, that where the structure of parts in brutes is the same as in 
men, and the operation of these parts also the same, the causes of that ope-
38 PES, p. 5.
39 Hume, Treatise, p. 8.
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ration cannot be different, and that whatever we discover to be true of the 
one species, may be concluded without hesitation to be certain of the other. 
Thus […] the very same hypothesis, which in one species explains muscular 
motion, the progress of the chyle, the circulation of the blood, must be 
applicable to every one; and according as it agrees or disagrees with the 
experiments we may make in any species of creatures, we may draw a proof 
of its truth or falsehood on the whole. Let us, therefore, apply this method 
of enquiry, which is found so just and useful in reasonings concerning the 
body, to our present anatomy of the mind, and see what discoveries we can 
make by it.40
Yet it is precisely not a physiological method of enquiry that Hume applies 
to his ‘anatomy of the mind’. Hume, instead, appeals to what can be direct-
ly and evidently known through reflection on the mind itself and how it 
works with its impressed contents and, as is well-known, arrives at the start-
ling discovery that the origin of our most popular idea of cause and effect 
that is so central to natural science and that we claim to know to exist bet-
ween external bodies around us is but a (mere) mental (psychological) as-
sociation of ideas in the mind, and not anything necessarily inherent in the 
nature of things themselves in ‘real existence’ and as pertaining to ‘matters-
of-fact’.41 Though the linkage in our minds of the idea of cause and effect 
between one thing and another is built up over time from impressions is 
psychologically unavoidable, for Hume, nonetheless, it is epistemologically 
unjustifiable. At any rate, though Hume does seem to accept a physiological 
theory of cognition, ‘this aspect of his thought is of little importance [to his 
manner of philosophizing], and is only reluctantly appealed to’.42 
Brentano of course is not at all reluctant to appeal to natural science, 
or to assert its importance to ‘psychology’ in his 1874 study, and indeed, 
as many commentators point out, defended earlier the thesis that ‘the true 
method of philosophy is none other than the natural sciences’ as one of the 
24 theses he presented for his public disputationes at Würzburg Universi-
40 Ibid. pp. 325–326.
41 See, ibid., Section IV.: ‘Of the Connexion or Association of Ideas’.
42 Matthew O’Donnell, ‘Hume’s Approach to Causation’, Philosophical Studies, 10 
(1960), 64–99 (p. 65).
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ty in 1866.43 At this time, however, Brentano had not yet engaged in any 
serious reading of English and German philosophers interested in natural 
science. And he certainly did not apply the method of the natural sciences in 
his 1866 habilitation thesis on Aristotle’s psychology. Brentano, therefore, 
clearly did not mean then that the philosopher must use observation, hypo-
theses, and laboratory experimentations in her science. He means, rather, 
that the nature of the object that is studied in any science is what must 
dictate the philosopher’s approach to that object, in much the same way as 
Aristotle had argued that one must begin at first with a familiarity of the 
objects to be studied (ta phainomena) and then move to discern the nature 
of those objects themselves.44 
By the time of his writing of PES, however, Brentano had become tho-
roughly aware of the natural-scientific approach to the study of ‘cognition’ 
from his reading of various writers, such as, Herbert Spencer’s Principles of 
Psychology, as well as works by Wundt, Helmholtz and Fechner. In practice, 
nevertheless, Brentano follows the psychological empiricism of Locke and 
Hume in his conviction that the way the human mind or human conscious-
ness can know itself is by direct reflection on the experiences of one’s own 
actual consciousness itself and its contents. This approach includes ‘physical 
phenomena’ as given directly in sensation because, as Brentano tells us, by 
physical phenomena he means ‘a colour […] which I see, a chord which I 
hear, warmth, cold, odour which I sense; as well as similar images which 
appear to me in the imagination.45 This position is not one that is associated 
with Aristotle or the Medieval Aristotelians; but, it is one that originates 
with Descartes, where Descartes (famously) remarks in the Second Medi-
tation,
43 See, Carl Stumpf, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, in The Philosophy of Franz 
Brentano, pp. 10–46.
44 Brentano applies this to the nature of experiences themselves, in his attempt in PES 
at a ‘natural classification’ of ‘psychical phenomena’ into three classes of: acts of 
presentations, acts of (true or false) judgements, and acts that take an interest in an 
object (acts of emotion).
45 PES, pp. 79–80. The terminological switch from ‘physical things’ in his 1866 
habilitation thesis on Aristotle’s psychology to ‘physical phenomena’ (qua ‘secondary 
qualities’) in his 1874 study of PES should alert commentators to the move in Brentano’s 
philosophical position away from any Aristotelian view of psychology, and towards his 
newly-acquired Cartesian-Lockean-Humean conception of that ‘science’.
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I am the same [one] who feels, that is to say, who perceives certain things, 
as by the organs of sense, since in truth I see light, I hear noise, I feel heat. 
But[,] it will be said[,] these phenomena are false and I am dreaming. Let it 
be so; still [and here is the important passage to note] it is at least quite certain 
that it seems to me that I see light, that I hear noise, and that I feel heat. That 
cannot be false [doubted].46 
It is from within this Cartesian frame of reference, what commentators 
now-a-days refer to as the classical foundationalists’ notion of ‘basic empi-
rical beliefs’ — and not from outside of this frame of reference — that  Brentano 
distinguishes the experiencing of ‘physical phenomena’ from ‘psychical 
phenomena’, that is to say, the act of hearing a tone qua ‘psychical pheno-
menon’ and the content of the act of the actual experience (the tone qua 
‘physical phenomenon’). In the reality of the ‘actual experience’, there is an 
immediately self-evident and directly discernible ‘natural unity’ between 
the act of hearing and its (intended) object within that experience itself but 
the tone is not the act of hearing a tone.47 Thus it turns out to be the case 
for Brentano that, ‘the object of an inner perception is simply [the existence 
of] a psychical phenomenon [qua psychical act-experience and its object], 
and the object of an outer [sensory] perception is simply [the existence of] 
a physical phenomenon, a sound, odour or the like [qua intended object of 
that particular act experience]’.48 Thus Brentano can now distinguish, from 
a descriptive-psychological point of view, the ‘psychical phenomenon’ qua act-
experience from the ‘physical phenomenon’ qua directly intended object 
of that experience. None of this points to that which that lies outside of 
the experience and in extra-mental existence. It is a distinction that occurs 
within the experiencing itself. This is why Brentano can (famously) say, in 
Book II of PES, that what characterises ‘psychical phenomena’/ ‘conscious 
acts’ in general is the ‘intentional’ or ‘mental’ or ‘immanent objectivity’ that 
is present in those ‘psychical phenomena’, and why Brentano is correct to 
say that his use of the terms ‘intentional’, ‘mental’ and ‘immanent objectivi-
46 René Descartes, Key Philosophical Writings, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. 
by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Ware: Wordsworth, 1997), p. 143 (my 
emphasis).
47 See, PES, Book II, ‘On the Unity of Consciousness’, pp. 155–176, esp., pp. 162–164.
48 Ibid., pp. 209–210.
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ty’ are all synonymous expressions qualifying the kind of existence of the 
(intended) objects of those acts themselves.49
The objects that consciousness is a consciousness of, then, turn out to be 
the actual experiences themselves (and their intentional objects, if they exist) 
which the ‘mentally active subject’ enjoys or endures.50 In this respect Bren-
tano is clearly subscribing to some version of Hume’s doctrine of ideas in 
49 In addition to noting the intentional (or mental or immanent) indwelling of an object in 
consciousness, Brentano also identifies ‘reference to a content’ and ‘direction towards 
an object’ as features of ‘psychical phenomena’ in the famous 1874 passage from PES 
(p. 88). He takes these expressions concerning the directedness or relation (Richtung, 
Beziehung) of the act of consciousness towards its object to be synonymous with each 
other too. It was only sometime after the publication of PES that Brentano begun 
to refer to this relation of the acts of consciousness to its objects as an ‘intentional 
relation’. See, Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, p. 23 and Franz Brentano, The Origin of 
our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, trans. by Roderick M. Chisholm & E. Schnerwind 
(London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 14. These two features of 
‘psychical phenomena’, the immanence of objects in consciousness and the directedness 
of the acts of consciousness towards an object which Brentano had originally spotted 
in his 1874 passage, express nonetheless different things about the psychical, and so, 
they should be ‘carefully distinguished’, as Theodore De Boer has pointed out (The 
Development of Husserl’s Thought, trans. by Theodore Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1978), p. 6). Brentano later relinquished the thesis of intentionality he had 
emphasised in the 1874 passage denoting the immanence of objects in consciousness 
‘during what Brentano scholars call the crisis of immanence (‘Immanenzkrise’) of 
1905’, but retained the second thesis of intentionality denoting the directedness or 
relation of the acts of consciousness towards their objects (however the latter are to 
be understood). Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical 
Introduction, 3rd rev. and enlarged edn (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), p. 48, n. 19.
50 Brentano, therefore, can play on the literal meaning of the German word ‘Bewusstsein’ — 
‘the term “consciousness”, since it refers to an object which consciousness is conscious 
of (von welchem das Bewusstsein Bewusstsein ist)’ (PES, p. 102) — as corroborating his 
(earlier) definition of the essence of consciousness as intentional, ‘i.e., [as having] the 
property of the intentional [=mental] in-existence of an object, for which we lack a 
word in common usage’ (PES, p. 88) since what consciousness is a-consciousness-of 
is to be (sein) aware (Bewusst). Later, Martin Heidegger will unravel the etymology 
of this same term ‘Bewusstein’ (as others did before him, e.g., Karl Marx) to stress 
that it implies some ‘meaning of Being’ first, and that this is what determines the 
meaning of ‘being aware’ (‘consciousness’), and not the other way around. This, of 
course, misconstrues the point that Brentano wishes to make, namely, that consciousness 
cannot be denied consciously as it evidently affirms itself self-referentially. In this, 
Brentano follows philosophically Descartes, Locke and Hume’s starting-point, i.e., the 
experience of reflection of consciousness on itself, and not the German or English 
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which it is held that the mind, in all of its operations and transactions, never 
has directly available to itself anything but its own perceptions. As Hume puts 
it, 
Nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions; and […] all the 
actions of seeing, hearing […] fall under its denomination. The mind may 
never exert in any action which may not be comprehended under the term 
perception.51 
Brentano, then, is quite certain, as was Descartes, Locke and Hume before 
him, that when one confines attention to reflection on one’s own actual 
experiences themselves it seems to him that he feels warmth, hears sounds, 
and sees colours. Brentano, nevertheless, does not quite follow Descartes, 
Locke and Hume down this road entirely. 
V. Brentano’s Scientific Materialism  
and His Deviance from Hume and Locke’s English Empiricisms
According to Brentano, whilst we are infallible knowers of the actual acts 
of experiencing (psychical phenomena) in inner perception, we are not in-
fallible knowers of the objects of the actual acts of outer perceptual-sense ex-
perience, that is, of ‘physical phenomena’ themselves. On the contrary, for 
Brentano, acts of outer (sense) perception are inherently false and necessarily 
misleading per se, not because, on some occasions, we succumb to sense illu-
sions, as Descartes noted, or because we misinterpret the subjective nature 
of those experiences as objective qualities of the object perceived, as Locke 
had noted and demonstrated through his famous experiment of putting 
one cold hand and one warm hand simultaneously into a basin of water of 
the same temperature to produce different experiences of ‘warmth in one 
language (which does not have the same etymological support for ‘consciousness’), nor 
the Medieval Aristotelians.
51 Hume, Treatise, p. 456. It is this ‘modern definition’ and ‘modern conception’ of 
psychology that originates from the inner perception of one’s own actual psychical 
phenomena (PES, pp. 18–19) that dominates Brentano’s understanding of psychology 
(philosophy) as a science throughout the 1870s, 1880s and into the early 1890s. 
Brentano returns to his interest in Aristotle in the early 1900s.
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hand and cold in the other, and thus proved that neither warmth nor cold 
really existed in the water.’52 Brentano, rather, argues further than Locke, 
in maintaining that the way in which sensorially perceivable qualities such 
as warmth, sound and colour really and truly exist extra-mentally — that 
is to say, in themselves (outside of our direct awareness of them) — are as 
‘molecular movements’, ‘atoms’, ‘light rays’, ‘forces’ and so forth. Brentano, 
alas, also calls these theoretically constructed objects of natural science ‘phy-
sical phenomena’, even though these are precisely things that never appear 
directly to (or in) consciousness. Since Brentano, nonetheless, understands 
these latter ‘physical phenomena’, that is, the objects of physics, as having, 
in truth, actual existence and not phenomenal existence, he has to qualify 
what he means in his definition of physics as the science of ‘physical phe-
nomena’, asserting,
I believe that I will not be mistaken if I assume that the definition of natural 
science as the science of physical phenomena is frequently connected with 
the concept of forces belonging to a world which is similar to the one extended 
in space and flowing in time; forces which, through their influence on the 
sense organs, arouse sensation and mutually influence each other in their 
action, and of which natural science investigates the laws of co-existence 
and succession. If those objects are considered as the objects of natural 
 sciences, there is also the advantage [over ‘physical phenomena’ considered 
as sensorial objects of actual acts of outer sense perception, as is evident 
from the context] that this science appears to have as its object something 
that really and truly exists.53 
To understand and be fair to Brentano’s position here, therefore, we must 
recognise two different meanings that Brentano operates for the one term of 
‘physical phenomena’ in PES.
‘Physical phenomena’, in sense1, are Lockean so-called secondary qua-
lities, that is, sensorially perceivable qualities (colours, sounds, odours, 
warmth etc.) which exist as the objects of those actual experiences. These 
exist only as long as the actual experience occurs, and so, they enjoy only phe-
nomenal existence. They exist as ‘immanent objects’ of actual acts of outer 
52 PES, p. 6.
53 Ibid., pp. 99–100, my emphasis.
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perceptual-sense experience. As Locke’s experiment demonstrates, warmth 
only exists in the experiencing and not as actual objective properties of 
things existing extra-mentally (water). 
‘Physical phenomena’, in sense2, are the theoretically constructed objects 
of natural science (light particles, sine waves, forces, etc.). When considered 
from a natural-scientific-theoretical point of view, these ‘physical pheno-
mena’ enjoy actual existence in a world that is hypothesized by the natural 
scientist as one that is ‘extended in space and flowing in time’, whether we 
are made aware of their actual existence through natural-scientific means, 
or not. 
It now follows, for Brentano, that since we think the colours that we see 
and the sounds that we hear (‘physical phenomena’ in sense1) really and truly 
exist like that outside of the experience in the objects of those experiences, 
but the way these phenomena really and truly exist are as has been uncove-
red by natural-scientific investigations (i.e., as ‘physical phenomena’ in sense2, 
as molecular movements, light particles, sine waves, atoms, forces etc..), 
then our everyday natural acts of outer sense perception are inherently 
mis-leading. The correct view of outer sense perception is that sensorially 
perceivable phenomenal objects (colours and sounds) are ‘signs’ of an extra-
mental reality that really and truly exists as determined by natural-scientific 
fact, i.e., as light rays and sound waves.54 This is why Brentano feels justi-
fied in concluding that,
we have no right, therefore, to believe that the objects of so-called outer 
perception really exist as they appear to us. Indeed, they demonstrably do 
not exist [as properties of the objects] outside of us [as shown through 
natural science, as is evident from the context]. In contrast to that which 
54 If we assume that natural science will provide the ‘basis’ for all such knowledge claims, 
then this is a version of what Timm Triplett calls ‘Theoretical Basics Foundationalism’, 
in his paper, ‘Recent Work on Foundationalism’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 27 
(1990), 93–116 (p. 98). Triplett remarks that this particular version of foundationalism 
(that Cornman identifies), ‘would hold that the theoretical statements of science are 
basic, being epistemologically prior to propositions about subjective psychological 
states and to ordinary singular propositions about the external world. However, I do 
not find any clear advocacy of such a view in the literature’ (ibid.). It seems to me, 
however, that this is the position that Brentano endorses and advocates in PES. See, 
‘the scientific task of the natural sciences’ in Brentano’s quote infra, in n. 56.
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really and truly exists [‘physical phenomena’, qua molecules, light particles], 
they [‘physical phenomena’, qua colours] are mere phenomena. […] We have 
no experience of that which truly exists [qua objects of physics], in and of 
itself, and that which we do experience [qua sensorial perceivable qualities 
of an object] is not true. The truth of physical phenomena is, as they say, 
only a relative truth .55 
We could put Brentano’s understanding of the task of the natural scientist 
this way. The natural scientist begins with the phenomena (or the objects) 
of our immediate experience, say, seeing a green leaf on a tree, in order to 
inform us that that is not how the greenness of the leaf actually exists inde-
pendently of our experiences; in terms of its colour, rather, the green leaf 
exists as actual light-particles or wave-lengths or wavicles, or as an upside-
down image residing in the retina of the eye stimulating certain C-fibres in 
one’s brain and so forth. These objects, the objects of natural science, have 
‘real’, ‘actual’, ‘true’ and ‘absolute’ [= independent] existence, outside of the 
mind.56 By comparison to these objects of physics, the sounds and colours 
that we experience exist only as long as the actual act of hearing and seeing 
occurs. Thus the ‘physical phenomena’ of sounds and colours do not have 
‘real’, ‘actual’, ‘true’ or ‘absolute’ existence, outside of the mind’s activity. 
They depend upon the actual psychical act-experiences for their existence. 
They only have a kind of ‘relative’ existence to actual psychical act-expe-
55 PES, p. 10 and p. 19, my emphasis.
56 ‘We could express the scientific task of the natural sciences by saying something to 
the effect that they are those sciences which seek to explain the succession of physical 
phenomena connected with normal and pure sensations (that is, sensations which 
are not influenced by special mental conditions and processes) on the basis of the 
assumption of a world with resembles one which has three dimensional extension 
in space and flows in one direction in time, and which influences our sense organs. 
Without explaining the absolute nature of this world, these sciences would limit 
themselves to ascribing to its forces capable of producing sensations and of exerting 
a reciprocal influence upon one another, and determining for these forces the laws of 
co-existence and succession. Through these laws they would then establish indirectly 
the laws of succession of the physical phenomena of sensations, if, through scientific 
abstraction from the concomitant mental conditions, we admit that they manifest 
themselves in a pure state and as occurring in relation to a constant sensory capacity. 
We must interpret the expression ‘science of physical phenomena’ in this somewhat 
complicated way if we want to identify it with natural science.’ PES, pp. 98–99.
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riences. They have only mental (or intentional) existence and only pheno-
menal existence since they exist only as long as the experiencing subject is 
having such experiences. When, however, the natural scientist decrees that 
the objects of his science really and truly exist, whereas the physical pheno-
mena (of sounds and colours) do not really and truly exist as they are in our ex-
periencing of them, that natural scientist turns into a metaphysician of sorts, 
or, perhaps more accurately speaking, into a metaphysician of the natural-
scientific-materialist variety. Thus both in his account of ‘physical pheno-
mena’ (colours sounds) and in his defence of the way natural science unco-
vers the reality of these phenomena (as molecular movements), Brentano, 
like so many of his contemporaries, is a natural-scientific materialist. Yet it 
is of importance to distinguish this natural-scientific materialism from the 
philosophical materialism of a Thales or a Democritus or an Aristotle or a 
Descartes or a Hume since these latter philosophical materialisms are based 
on philosophical reflection and philosophical speculation, and not on the 
established facts of natural science.57 
In all of this, however, it is the positivism of the ‘modern English philo-
sophers’ to which Brentano is committed in his view of psychology because 
the primary objects that are perceived as they are in themselves are one’s 
own actual experiences. ‘Inner perception’, Brentano re-iterates in The Ori-
gin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1889), ‘tells me that I am now hav-
ing such-and-such sound or colour sensations, or that I am now thinking or 
willing this or that.’58 Whether one wishes to emphasize the point that it is 
‘I’ who am having such and such sensations, or that there exists acts of thin-
king or willing or sensing this or that, or that the objects of such particular 
psychical act-experiences are the directly intended objects of sensation, co-
gnition and volition, it is the actual psychical act-experiences as particular 
experiences themselves that, in Brentano’s view, constitute the origin upon 
which all empirical and normative judgements are based.59
57 See, John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (London: Penguin, 1968; 1980), 
p. 35.
58 Brentano, On the Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, pp. 19–20.
59 Brentano never relinquishes this position after PES. See, PES, Appendix XII, pp. 311–
314. ‘Thinking is Universal, Entities are Individual [Dictated November 21, 1917.]’ 
This erroneous date was taken over from the German 1924 edition, p. 199. For the 
correct date [21.02.1917] see the index, ibid., p. VII.
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VI. Some Conclusions and Evaluations of Brentano’s Change  
in Views on the Science of Psychology  
and his Discovery of the Intentionality of Consciousness 
Sometime between 1866 and the writing of PES Brentano turns away from 
his originally-held Aristotelian approach to psychology as a science of the 
soul, and adopts instead a ‘modern conception’ of psychology that stresses 
the ability of our consciousness to reflect directly upon its own operations 
as the first and foremost reality to be studied in and for that science.  Since 
this ‘psychology’ is interested in focussing its attention on describing this 
‘subject matter’, questions pertaining to the causal origins of such ‘con-
scious acts’ or ‘psychical phenomena’ can be set aside in this science of ‘de-
scriptive psychology’ or ‘psychognosy’, as Brentano later coins the term. 
Causal-hypothetical investigations belong to that part of the natural science 
of empirical psychology which Brentano calls ‘genetic psychology’, for, as 
Hume had earlier put it, such concern ‘belongs more to anatomists and 
natural philosophers [natural scientists] than to the moral [philosophers]’.60 
Brentano, in other words, in the elaboration of his new science of ‘descrip-
tive psychology’ has switched his philosophical allegiance away from both 
Aristotle and contemporary natural scientists, and chosen instead to follow 
Hume.
‘Another important difference’ which Brentano stresses that exists bet-
ween the kind of science that is to be pursued in the descriptive part of the 
empirical science of psychology in comparison to ‘genetic psychology’, the 
natural-scientific component of psychology, is that descriptive psychology 
‘is an exact science, and that in contrast, genetic psychology, in all its deter-
minations, in an inexact one’.61 By an exact science, Brentano means those 
‘sciences which can formulate their doctrines sharply and precisely’, such 
as, for instance, ‘a mathematician doesn’t say: the sum of the angles of a 
60 ‘Psychognosy […] teaches [us] nothing about the causes that give rise to human 
consciousness […] [and will] never mention a physico-chemical process in any of its 
doctrines (Lehrsatz). […] For, correct as it is to say that such processes are preconditions 
for consciousness, one must resolutely contradict the person who, out of a confusion 
of thought, claims that our consciousness in itself is to be seen as a physico-chemical 
event, that it itself is composed out of chemical elements.’ Brentano, Descriptive 
Psychology, p. 4.
61 Ibid., p. 4–5.
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triangle is often, or usually, equal to two right angles. But he says that this 
is always and without exception the case’.62 Descriptive psychology seeks 
this kind of precision and accuracy in its knowledge-claims. By distinc-
tion, all natural-scientific investigations, including genetic psychology, seek 
knowledge-claims that are true for the most part, but such truths are never 
necessarily true, and so, the ‘stimulation of a retinal part [of the eye] by a 
light-ray of a certain frequency [which] induces the phenomenon of blue’ 
does ‘not always’ induce the phenomenon of blue ‘as it is not true in case 
of (a) colour-blindness, (b) interruption of the conductor, severance of the 
nerve, (c) losing in competition (Besiegtwerden im Wettstreit), (d) replace-
ment by a hallucination’.63
This division of the sciences by Brentano into exact and inexact sciences 
corresponds, by and large, to the epistemological distinction that Hume 
famously draws between knowledge-claims pertaining to ‘matters of fact’ 
and those pertaining to ‘relation of ideas’, and before Hume, to Leibniz’s 
distinction between ‘truths of fact’ and ‘truths of reason’.64 Descriptive psy-
chology seeks ‘vérités de raison’, that is to say, items of knowledge that are 
eternally true. Descriptive psychology does not seek inductive, hypotheti-
cal, empirical generalisations the truth of which could always turn out to 
be otherwise than it is. In this respect, it is worth stressing the point that 
Brentano, like Hume, never employed the method of the natural sciences in 
his actual descriptive-psychological philosophizing.65 What natural scientists 
study and find through their method of observation, scientific hypotheses 
62 Ibid., p. 5.
63 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
64 See, Oskar Kraus, ‘Introduction to the 1924 Edition [of PES]’, in ‘Appendix’ to PES, 
pp. 369–408 (p. 370).
65 How non-hypothetical, intuitively demonstrable a priori knowledge-claims about 
consciousness and its objectivities are exactly related to, or complemented by natural-
scientific knowledge-claims that are hypothetically ascertained, empirically verifiable 
and, by nature, corrigible and probably true of the physical world about us, including 
ourselves as hypothesized ‘things’ in and of that world, does not feature as problematic 
in Brentano’s thought. This problematic, however, occupies Husserl’s attention 
greatly in the development of his thought. See, Ch 2., § 40 ‘“Primary” and “Secondary” 
Qualities. The Physical Thing Given “In Person” a “Mere Appearance” of the “True 
Physical Thing” Determined in Physics’, in Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction 
to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. by Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
288
and laboratory experiment is simply not the kind of knowledge that we can 
and do arrive at both in and through direct reflection on our experiences 
themselves, that is to say, through what Brentano calls the ‘inner percep-
tion of our own psychical phenomena’. Unlike Hume, however, Brentano 
believes that we can gain incorrigible insights into the nature of those expe-
riences themselves that are both necessarily true of those experiences and of 
epistemological significance. Thus, in practice, Brentano employs a more 
mathematical model of reasoning in his new descriptive-psychological me-
thod (and so, in this regard one can understand why Husserl was so taken 
with Brentano’s ‘style’ of philosophizing at Vienna University in the early 
1880s). 
Even though the term ‘descriptive psychology’ is not employed by Bren-
tano in his 1874 PES, the task for the descriptive psychologist in this work 
is to pick out those essential features that are intuitively demonstrable in 
all of our psychical act-experiences and their immanent objects that can-
not, in an a priori manner of speaking, be known to be otherwise than they 
are. According to Brentano, the object-relatedness of all conscious acts, the 
‘intentionality of consciousness’, is just one such intelligible structure that 
is evidently true and discernible in the nature of psychical act-experiences 
themselves. Like all descriptive-psychological items of knowledge, this 
item of knowledge, the object-relatedness of all psychical act-experiences, 
expresses, for Brentano, a ‘truth of reason’. It is grasped ‘at one stroke and 
without induction.’66 
This, then, explains, to a certain degree, why it was a new discovery for 
Brentano — even though he did not think it was a new discovery himself, 
but a mere re-introduction by him of the Scholastic concept of the intenti-
onal in-existence of an object — to note that the object-relatedness of our 
actual experiences is an essential feature of those experiences themselves 
by comparison to physical phenomena (e.g, tones, colours etc.) which the 
‘English empiricists’ whom he had read had failed to note and to distinguish. 
No such discovery is possible within an Aristotelian view of psychology. 
And since Brentano no longer accepts the ‘agent intellect’ and its abstractive 
Publishers, 1982). Cf., Theodore de Boer, ‘The Meaning of Husserl’s Idealism in the 
Light of His Development’, Analecta Husserliana, 2 (1972), 322–332.
66 Kraus, ‘Introduction to the 1924 Edition [of PES]’, p. 370. ‘This point’, Kraus 
continues, ‘was made by Brentano in his work The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right 
and Wrong in 1889’. Ibid.
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power as playing any explanatory role in our knowledge-claims about the 
world about us, the object-relatedness that is characteristic of the activity 
of consciousness, as Brentano understands it, denotes, as it did for Hume, 
the passive possession of consciousness of its objectivities. The impressed 
contents are distinct, but related to the activity (= passivity) of the acts that 
bears them. This relatedness between the activity (passivity) of psychical 
act-experiences and their contents that Brentano identifies is nonetheless 
found, albeit in embryonic fashion, in Hume, and not in Aristotle and the 
medieval Aristotelians.67 Hume, after all, does inform us about what ‘im-
pressions’ are not:
By the term of impression I would not be understood to express the man-
ner, in which our lively perceptions are produced in the soul, but merely 
the perceptions themselves; for which there is no particular name either in 
the English or any other language, that I know of.68
The impression in the soul, for Hume, then, ‘is not the act of impressing a 
perception on the soul, but the “impress”, its result’.69 Here, as O’Donnell 
comments, Hume is distinguishing perceptions that refer to impressions alo-
ne, the impress, from Locke’s view that all perceptions are ‘ideas’.70 And it 
is from within a focus on the impress — that is to say, on a sound as heard, 
a colour as seen, an odour as smelt and so forth — that Brentano makes 
the further descriptive-psychological-analytical distinction between the directly 
intended objects of those experiences (a tone, a colour) and the psychical act-expe-
riences themselves that contain those objects ‘for which’, like Hume, Brentano 
remarks, ‘we lack a word in common usage [in English or in German]’, but 
which Brentano did find in the Medieval-Latin terminology of the ‘intenti-
67 Thus Philip Bartok’s reiteration that ‘(H)e [Brentano] insisted that the central doctrines 
of his psychology, the doctrines of intentionality and inner perception, were doctrines 
that had clear precedents in the work of Aristotle and the Scholastics’, is a reiteration of 
Brentano’s own, and often misleading, self-interpretation. Philip J. Bartok, ‘Brentano’s 
Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings’, Journal 
of History of Philosophy, 43 (2005), 437–60 (p. 454). Cf., also, Bartok’s corresponding 
references at p. 454, n. 59.
68 Hume, Treatise, p. 2, note.
69 O’Donnell, p. 65, my emphasis.
70 Ibid., n. 7.
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onal (or mental) in-existence of an object’ that is opposed to any kind of real, 
natural, substantial existence of a thing outside of the mind.71 The passive 
possession of ‘our own actual psychical phenomena’ (i.e., of our actual psy-
chical act-experiences and their objects) is the starting point for Hume, as it 
is for Brentano. All of this, nonetheless, is premissed on Hume’s assumpti-
on that access to consciousness (and its impressions) is peculiarly direct and 
certain when compared to anything else and on Locke’s dualistic-metaphy-
sical view of human subjectivity as comprising a lucid mind and an opaque 
body, but these presuppositions do not invalidate the descriptive-psycholo-
gical tenet that consciousness is always, in an a priori manner of speaking, 
a consciousness of something, a tenet that Brentano originally arrived at and 
discovered for himself in his efforts to understand and follow somewhat in 
agreement, and somewhat in disagreement, the significant ‘scientific con-
tributions of modern English philosophers’.72
71 PES, p. 102. For a treatment of Brentano’s deviance from the Scholastic concept of 
intentionality, see, Cyril McDonnell, ‘Understanding and Assessing “Brentano‘s 
Thesis” in Light of His Modification of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality’, 
Brentano Studien XIII (2015), 153 – 182.
72 Husserl evaluates Brentano ‘as a path finder’ (als Wegbereiter) in his ‘discovery’ of this 
structure of consciousness for a new descriptive science of intentional consciousness 
and its objectivities. See, Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, Vorlesungen 
Sommersemester 1925, Gesammelte Werke, Husserliana (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1968), Vol. 
IX, ed. by Walter Biemel, ‘§ 3d Brentano als Wegbereiter für die Forschung in innerer 
Erfahrung — Entdeckung der Intentionalität als Grundcharakter des Psychischen’, 
pp. 31–5; Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, trans. by John 
Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), ‘Section (d) Brentano as pioneer for 
research in internal experience — discovery of intentionality as the fundamental 
character of the psychic’, pp. 23–27.
